El derecho a impugnar la sentencia condenatoria

Abstract

This article aims to determine both the meaning and scope of the constitutional hermeneutic rule established in the second subsection of art. 93 of the Charter as the meaning and scope, through the application of said hermeneutic rule, of the right to challenge the guilty verdict, provided for in the fourth paragraph of art. 29 ibid. In order to do so, it is based on the dis-tinction between this right and the right to the double instance recognized in art. 31 of the Constitution; a hypothesis is proposed as to what should be understood as an interpretation of the rights and duties recognized in the Constitution in accordance with the international treaties on human rights ratified by Colombia; there are hypothetical scenarios necessary to capture the nuances that the Colombian legal system provides for the exercise of this right; the exercise of this right in each scenario is analyzed, with the difficulties that follow of the omission of the legislator of his duty to regulate it and of the effects given to the decision of unenforceability in Judgment C-792 of 2014; and concludes that, since it is a fundamental constitutional right, its interpretation must be made in accordance with the pro homine principle, so as to be as broad as possible and, by virtue of the principles of equality and favora-bility, its exercise must be regulated by Law and can not be limited in time, from a milestone different from its recognition by the Constitution or by an international treaty that is part of the constitutionality block.